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The Regrettable Underenforcement of Incompetence  
as Cause To Dismiss Tenured Faculty 
DAVID M. RABBAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
Universities are extremely reluctant to dismiss tenured professors for 
incompetence. This reluctance compromises the convincing and broadly accepted 
justification for the protection of academic freedom through tenure set forth in the 
1915 Declaration of Principles of the American Association of University Professors 
(AAUP).1 After asserting that society benefits from the academic freedom of 
professors to express their professional views without fear of dismissal,2 the 1915 
Declaration maintained that the grant of permanent tenure following a probationary 
period of employment protects academic freedom.3 Yet the 1915 Declaration also 
stressed that academic freedom does not extend to expression that fails to meet 
professional standards.4 Nor, it added, does permanent tenure prevent dismissal for 
cause, which could include “professional incompetency”5 as well as misconduct.6 It 
reasoned that only fellow faculty members have the expertise to determine departures 
from professional standards.7 It, therefore, insisted that a professor is entitled to a 
hearing by a committee of faculty peers before being dismissed8 and that professors 
have an “obligation” to serve on these committees.9 
Numerous concerns help explain the reluctance to seek dismissals for 
incompetence justified by the 1915 Declaration. The possibility of dismissal weakens 
the protection of tenure. Charges of incompetence could be pretexts for violating 
academic freedom and free speech, for unlawful or unfair discrimination, or for other 
impermissible motivations, including unpopularity. Even if not pretextual, charges 
of incompetence might be incorrect, and peer review committees might mistakenly 
sustain them. Charges against the truly incompetent could be misconstrued as an 
attack on academic freedom or as otherwise discriminatory or unjustified, thereby 
harming a university’s reputation. Dismissal proceedings are costly in money and 
time, and could be invalidated by procedural errors. Faculty committees might be 
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reluctant to recommend dismissal of a colleague even when clearly justified. 
Disagreements about the legitimacy or necessity of dismissal proceedings could 
cause conflicts that would undermine the collegiality on which universities depend.  
I believe that these concerns, though understandable, do not justify inaction and 
are often overstated. I also offer suggestions to minimize them. Before initiating 
dismissal proceedings for incompetence, universities should offer opportunities for 
remediation and, even if they fail, consider lesser sanctions. University regulations 
should provide detailed definitions of incompetence, making clear that dismissal is 
an extraordinary remedy to be used only in extreme circumstances constituting gross 
deficiencies in quality or productivity. Examples of incompetence could include 
failure to convey course content in teaching and failure to publish over a lengthy 
period of time. The relatively few judicial decisions involving the dismissal of 
tenured faculty indicate that these suggestions are not legally necessary.10 But 
providing more specific guidance than the law requires should remove some of the 
understandable hesitation about instituting dismissal proceedings even against the 
small, though not insignificant, number of professors broadly viewed by their 
colleagues as clearly incompetent. 
The 1915 Declaration viewed tenure as a means to protect academic freedom, 
not as the shelter for incompetent professors that it has become through the extreme 
reluctance to use the very procedures it proposed to dismiss them. Proper 
enforcement of incompetence as cause for dismissal would restore tenure to its 
legitimate function, increase popular support for it, and improve faculty morale 
by enabling professors to perform their professional responsibilities in peer 
review. 
I. THE 1915 DECLARATION 
Peer review was the major innovation in the defense of academic freedom in the 
1915 Declaration,11 the founding document of the AAUP and still the most 
comprehensive and influential treatment of the subject in the United States. Just as 
academic freedom is necessary to protect the expert professional speech of 
professors,12 the 1915 Declaration reasoned, peer review is necessary to determine if 
professors meet the professional standards that justify the protection of academic 
freedom.13 According to the 1915 Declaration, the social function of professors is to 
convey, after lengthy and specialized training, the results of their research and 
analysis to students and to the general public.14 To perform this function, professors 
must be free of any suspicion that their academic views are based on anything other 
than professional considerations.15 They cannot be subject to pressure from those 
“who endow or manage universities” or from external sources.16 
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The distinctive professional speech that justifies the protection of academic 
freedom, the 1915 Declaration emphasized, also defines the limits of academic 
freedom. It made clear that academic freedom “in no sense” allows individual 
professors to “be exempt from all restraints as to the matter or manner of their 
utterances.”17 Maintaining that the right to engage in academic speech “entail[s] 
certain correlative obligations,”18 it stressed that professors must meet scholarly 
standards and that “members of the academic profession” should have “the initial 
responsibility” for determining if departures from them have occurred.19 
Reiterating the same rationale it used to defend academic freedom, it reasoned that 
others “necessarily lack full competency to judge” and that “their intervention can 
never be exempt from the suspicion that it is dictated by other motives than zeal 
for the integrity of science.”20 It recognized that professors had not previously “had 
the opportunity, or perhaps the disposition” to make these determinations and that 
for many professors this “obligation” would seem “unwelcome and burdensome.”21 
Professors might find it difficult to exercise “the capacity for impersonal 
judgment” and the “judicial severity” that might be required.22 But if professors do 
not accept the responsibility to “purge” their “incompetent and . . . unworthy” 
colleagues, it warned, “the task will be performed by others” who, because they 
are not professors themselves, “lack certain essential qualifications for performing 
it, and whose action is sure to breed suspicions and recurrent controversies deeply 
injurious to the internal order and the public standing of universities.”23 The 
“practical proposals” at the end of the 1915 Declaration included hearings before 
faculty peers before dismissal.24 The proposals left the determination of legitimate 
grounds for dismissing a professor to individual universities but asserted that:  
[I]f the charge is one of professional incompetency, a formal report upon 
his work should be first made in writing by the teachers of his own 
department and of cognate departments in the university, and, if the 
teacher concerned so desire[s], by a committee of his fellow-specialists 
from other institutions, appointed by some competent authority.25 
In contemporary presentations to the Association of American Universities, 
John Dewey, the president of the AAUP, and Arthur Lovejoy, one of the prominent 
authors of the 1915 Declaration, stressed that peer review would benefit 
universities. Dewey declared that it would provide “a method for the dismissal of 
unworthy or incompetent teachers” while protecting the president and trustees 
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“from suspicion and criticism.”26 He believed that “the public would come to 
accept any dismissal which was approved by a representative body of the teacher’s 
colleague[s] after opportunity for a judicial hearing.”27 As a result, it would be 
difficult for a dismissed professor to raise credible claims “of personal injustice, 
or vengeance, or infringement on academic freedom.”28 Reinforcing Dewey’s 
point, Lovejoy observed that in the absence of peer review every dismissal, 
“whether justified or unjustified, is likely to be made the occasion for a hue and 
cry about the violation of the principle of academic freedom.”29 Lovejoy also 
highlighted the importance of having “the proper grounds of dismissal reasonably 
well defined.”30 
The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure (1940 
Statement), jointly formulated by the AAUP and the Association of American 
Colleges (AAC) and subsequently endorsed by over 200 societies of academic 
disciplines or institutions, reiterated the assertion of the 1915 Declaration that 
incompetence as determined by peer review constitutes cause for terminating a 
tenured appointment.31 The first sentence under the heading “Academic Tenure” 
provided that the appointments of tenured faculty members “should be terminated 
only for adequate cause, except in the case of retirement for age, or under 
extraordinary circumstances because of financial exigencies.”32 In describing the 
process of peer review to determine if adequate cause exists, the 1940 Statement 
asserted, in language similar to the 1915 Declaration, that in hearings involving 
“charges of incompetence the testimony should include that of teachers and other 
scholars, either from the teacher’s own or from other institutions.”33 A generation 
later, the Commission on Academic Tenure in Higher Education, jointly sponsored 
by the AAUP and the AAC in 1971,34 reaffirmed incompetence as one of the 
adequate causes for dismissing a tenured faculty member.35 It “believe[d] that 
‘adequate cause’ in faculty dismissal proceedings should be restricted to (a) 
demonstrated incompetence or dishonesty in teaching or research, (b) substantial and 
manifest neglect of duty, and (c) personal conduct which substantially impairs the 
individual’s fulfillment of his institutional responsibilities.”36 
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II. THE DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES OF VAN ALSTYNE AND BREWSTER  
ON DISMISSAL FOR CAUSE 
During the hundred years since 1915, the AAUP has taken pains to emphasize 
that the possibility of dismissal for cause demonstrates that tenure is not a guarantee 
of lifetime employment. William Van Alstyne wrote a particularly effective 
statement of the AAUP position in the early 1970s when he was a professor at Duke 
Law School and chair of the AAUP’s Committee A on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure.37 He observed that universities are free to determine for themselves what 
constitutes cause for dismissal as long as cause does not violate academic freedom or 
civil liberties generally.38 Cause can include “failure to meet a specified norm of 
performance or productivity, as well as . . . specified acts of affirmative misconduct.”39 
The grant of tenure establishes “a rebuttable presumption of the individual’s 
professional excellence” that shifts the burden of proving cause for dismissal to the 
university.40 To establish cause, the university must convince a peer review 
committee to make three findings: (1) that the stated cause is the actual cause for 
dismissal rather than a pretext for an impermissible motivation, (2) that the stated 
cause exists in fact, and (3) that the demonstrated cause is serious enough to warrant 
termination rather than a lesser sanction.41 It is important to emphasize that, from the 
1915 Declaration to the present, the peer review committee has been given only the 
“initial responsibility” for assessing cause.42 The AAUP’s Recommended 
Institutional Regulations, adopted by most universities, elaborate this point by 
providing that if the peer review committee “concludes that adequate cause for 
dismissal has not been established by the evidence in the record,” the president or 
the governing board can reject that conclusion and dismiss the faculty member as 
long as they state in writing their reasons for doing so and gave the peer review 
committee an opportunity to respond and reconsider.43 
Soon after Van Alstyne wrote, Kingman Brewster, the president of Yale, 
challenged the AAUP’s emphasis that tenure is not an absolute protection against 
dismissal. Brewster maintained that at most universities, and certainly at Yale, 
“tenure is for all normal purposes a guarantee of appointment until retirement age.”44 
He acknowledged a very few occasions when “[p]hysical or mental incapacity, some 
chronic disability, some frightful act of moral turpitude, or persistent neglect of all 
university responsibilities” have led to negotiated terminations of tenured faculty.45 
Yet he observed that “even in extreme circumstances there is a deep reluctance to 
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compromise the expectations of tenure.”46 “For both human and institutional 
reasons,” he added, “it is the practice to ride it out even in cases where performance 
has fallen way below reasonable expectations.”47 Unfortunately, Brewster did not 
elaborate what he meant by “human and institutional reasons.” I assume by human 
reasons he meant the difficulty of taking such a drastic action against colleagues, 
often friends. And by institutional reasons he might have meant the costs of a 
dismissal proceeding in time and money and the danger that universities would be 
perceived, however unjustly, as jeopardizing the academic freedom protected by 
tenure. 
Brewster enthusiastically supported tenure even though he viewed it as the 
practical equivalent of a lifetime appointment. He maintained that “[b]oldness would 
suffer if the research and scholarship of a mature faculty were to be subject to 
periodic scorekeeping, on pain of dismissal if they did not score well.”48 Having 
proved their professional potential during the probationary period before receiving 
tenure, faculty “should not feel beholden to anyone,” especially university 
administrators, “for favor, let alone for survival.”49 In “strong universities” like Yale, 
he observed, “assuring freedom from intellectual conformity coerced within the 
institution is even more of a concern than is the protection of freedom from external 
interference.”50 He opposed post-tenure review, worrying that “[i]t would both 
dampen the willingness to take long-term intellectual risks and inhibit if not corrupt 
the free and spirited exchanges upon which the vitality of a community of scholars 
depends.”51 The understanding that tenure is a lifetime commitment, he added, makes 
the decision to award tenure more rigorous. As he put it: “Realization that the 
commitment is for keeps helps to hold the standards high.”52 He believed that 
“whatever gains might be made by reserving the right to a second guess would be 
more than offset by the laxity which would come to soften the first guess.”53  
III. THE FREQUENCY OF DISMISSAL FOR CAUSE 
The AAUP is correct in theory in maintaining that tenure is not a guarantee of 
lifetime employment and that cause for dismissal can include incompetence as well 
as misconduct. But Brewster more accurately reflects practice in observing that 
tenured professors are rarely dismissed. Yet it is important to emphasize that rarely 
does not mean never. 
I know of no accurate empirical data regarding the frequency of dismissals for 
cause in American universities. A 1994 article in the Chronicle of Higher Education 
claimed about fifty a year,54 and a 2005 article in the Wall Street Journal claimed 
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about fifty to seventy-five out of 280,000 tenured professors in the United States.55 I 
checked with a staff member at the AAUP who, based on inquiries he and his 
colleagues receive about ongoing dismissal proceedings, estimates the numbers are 
somewhat higher.56 And, as he points out, some dismissal proceedings certainly 
occur without anyone contacting the AAUP.57 There are many other “involuntary 
departures” of tenured professors that do not reach the stage of a formal dismissal.58 
Even if the annual dismissals for cause number in the hundreds nationally, probably 
only a small proportion of them are based on charges of incompetence. As Walter 
Metzger, the leading historian of academic freedom and tenure, has observed, “it is 
the display of evil character, not the display of weak ability” that has prompted most 
dismissals for cause.59 Charges of sexual misconduct, plagiarism, or falsification of 
data are far more likely than charges of incompetence. 
I believe that the paucity of dismissal proceedings citing incompetence as cause 
has permitted the continued employment of an intolerably high number of tenured 
professors at American universities who do not meet the most minimal standards of 
competence in scholarship, teaching, or both. Writing in 1990, Henry Rosovsky, the 
dean at Harvard, expressed what he called the “totally unscientific conclusion” that 
less than two percent of the faculty at Harvard and other major research universities 
could legitimately be labelled “deadwood.”60 Around the same date, Ralph Brown 
and Jordan Kurland, two AAUP activists, estimated that five percent of all faculty at 
American colleges and universities were “deadwood.”61 In 2014, James J. White of 
the University of Michigan Law School, based on his observation of his own faculty 
and on what he called “bar stool” research on other faculties, estimated that five to 
ten percent of tenured faculty at institutions where research is required for tenure 
would fail any reasonable test of scholarship.62 He also guessed that a “somewhat 
smaller” percentage would fail any reasonable test of teaching.63 These estimates 
strike me as quite close to each other and are consistent with my observations at my 
own university and at universities where I have visited. Based on my personal 
experience, I am also struck by the widespread consensus within faculties about the 
identity of their colleagues who do not meet minimal standards of competence. 
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How much of a problem is a two to ten percent rate of incompetence among 
tenured faculty at American universities? Though low on a scale of zero to one 
hundred percent, I think it is a significant problem. Perhaps a similar rate of 
incompetence exists among physicians and airline pilots. I doubt most people, 
including professors, would consider that percentage sufficiently low to justify 
decisions by hospitals or airline companies to retain them. Should we care less about 
incompetent professors because life or death is not at stake? If we take our 
professional work of scholarship and teaching seriously, I think we should care a lot, 
even though the possible consequences of incompetence do not include death. 
Kingman Brewster apparently thought that for cause dismissals against 
admittedly incompetent tenured faculty would unduly weaken the protection tenure 
affords academic freedom.64 Because I agree that tenure is a vital safeguard for 
academic freedom, and that academic freedom is vital for the effective pursuit and 
dissemination of knowledge, I would tolerate a two to ten percent level of 
incompetence if I thought bringing dismissal charges would have this result. But I 
do not. Indeed, I think bringing such charges would strengthen the tenure system by 
conforming practice to the convincing theoretical justification for tenure and thereby 
provide more public support for academic freedom. It would also increase faculty 
morale currently burdened by the knowing acquiescence in institutionalizing 
incompetence. 
IV. INSTITUTIONAL REGULATIONS 
Institutional regulations regarding dismissal of tenured faculty vary widely. Some 
are quite vague. The rules of the University of Texas System simply state that 
termination “will be only for good cause shown”65 without any elaboration of what 
constitutes “good cause.”66 Some universities provide examples of “cause” without 
specifically mentioning “incompetence.” The rules at Wesleyan University state:  
Sufficient cause must be related, directly and substantially, to the fitness 
of faculty members in their professional capacities as teachers or 
scholars. . . . Examples of behavior that, in their most serious form, may 
directly and substantially detract from the professional capacities of 
faculty members in their roles as teachers and scholars are plagiarism, 
dishonest research, fiscal malfeasance, and physical abuse or other illegal 
workplace harassment of students, faculty, or staff.67  
Some universities specify “incompetence” as cause for dismissal. Whereas Indiana 
University, Bloomington only uses the word “incompetence” itself,68 Princeton and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 64. See Brewster, supra note 44, at 383.  
 65. BD. OF REGENTS, THE UNIV. OF TEX. SYS., RULES & REGULATIONS R. 31008 § 2(1) 
(2014). 
 66. See id. 
 67. WESLEYAN UNIV., PROCEDURES OF THE FACULTY COMM. ON RIGHTS & 
RESPONSIBILITIES § 301. 
 68. IND. UNIV., BLOOMINGTON, ACADEMIC GUIDE POLICY E-2 (2010). 
2015] INCOMPETENCE AS CAUSE TO DISMISS TENURED FACULTY 47 
 
Stanford universities have identical rules that require proof of “substantial and 
manifest incompetence.”69 
Some universities have separate sections in their tenure rules, or even independent 
policy statements, that deal with dismissal for “substandard” or “incompetent” 
performance. The policy on “Faculty Tenure” at the University of Minnesota 
contains a section entitled “Special Peer Review In Cases Of Alleged Substandard 
Performance By Tenured Faculty.”70 The previous section requires an annual review 
of every faculty member.71 Under that provision, if the head of an academic unit and 
the elected peer merit review committee “both find a faculty member’s performance 
to be substantially below the goals and expectations adopted by that unit, they shall 
advise the faculty member in writing, including suggestions for improving 
performance, and establish a time period (of at least one year) within which 
improvement should be demonstrated.”72 If at the end of this period “a tenured 
faculty member’s performance continues to be substantially below the goals and 
expectations of the unit and there has not been a sufficient improvement of 
performance,” the section on substandard performance provides, “the head of the 
academic unit and the elected peer merit review committee may jointly request the 
dean to initiate a special peer review of that faculty member.”73 After a hearing, the 
special peer review panel may recommend various actions, including alteration in 
the allocation of the faculty member’s “expected effort among the teaching, research, 
service and governance functions,” or, if the faculty member’s performance is “so 
inadequate,” “limited reductions of salary” or “formal proceedings for 
termination.”74 
The University of California has a separate, detailed policy statement entitled 
“Termination for Incompetent Performance.”75 The introduction emphasizes that its 
standards and procedures balance two “conflicting imperatives”: the need for the 
university to “fulfill its central functions” without impairment “by the presence of 
incompetent faculty” and the “freedom and security protected by tenure.”76 The 
policy recognizes that termination of tenured faculty for incompetence “is an 
extraordinary remedy designed to address gross performance deficiencies in 
extremely rare cases.”77 Like the Minnesota policy, it observes that there are many 
ways short of dismissal to address substandard performance, including conferences 
with academic administrators, denial of merit increases, formal notification, and 
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alteration of faculty responsibilities.78 For faculty with excellent teaching records but 
inadequate research or creative activities, the policy permits an increase in teaching 
load or a mutually agreed transfer to a position as a lecturer.79 A separate section 
addresses “Standards for Determination of Incompetent Performance.”80 It defines 
incompetence in research or creative activity as not engaging in “bona fide” activity 
for “several years” and “no satisfactory evidence” of probable engagement “in the 
foreseeable future.”81 Infrequency of publication and funding, it adds, is not “per se” 
evidence of incompetence.82 Observing that scholarly norms differ among 
disciplines, it maintains that the faculty member’s “current research area” should 
provide the standard for evaluation.83 It defines incompetence in teaching as 
“intellectual content” or “pedagogical skills” that are “so far below the professional 
standards of university-level instruction” that continued teaching would be “a 
disservice to students.”84 In making these determinations, the policy encourages 
evaluations by current and former students and by faculty colleagues.85 While 
recognizing that teaching and research are the main responsibilities of university 
faculty, the policy also states that university service, public service, and professional 
service should be “part of the assessment of an individual’s overall performance.”86 
I believe that clear and detailed provisions defining incompetence as cause for 
revocation of tenure are more fair and effective than vaguer definitions of cause. I 
find many of the provisions in the Minnesota and California policies attractive. 
Remediation should be attempted before the initiation of dismissal proceedings.87 
For scholarship, remediation could include counseling about a research agenda and 
reviews of outlines and drafts by faculty colleagues. For teaching, remediation could 
include observation of classes taught by successful teachers and visits by those 
successful teachers to the classes of the person needing remediation followed by 
advice on how to improve. Some universities have programs designed to improve 
teacher performance that could be required.88 Even when remediation fails, 
alternatives to dismissal might be preferable, such as reduction of salary or, for 
effective teachers who do not meet minimal levels of scholarly performance, 
assigning more courses than the norm for the department. While teaching and 
research are the main responsibilities of faculty, other service to the university, the 
profession, and the general public should be part of the overall assessment of 
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competence. Evaluations of competence should be sensitive to the differences among 
universities as well as among disciplines. Just as the quantity of publications and the 
balance between articles and books vary among disciplines, the relative weight of 
research and teaching varies between liberal arts colleges and research universities 
and among particular institutions within each category.   
In defining incompetent scholarship, I would prefer a standard of extremely few 
or no scholarly publications over a lengthy period of time, perhaps five to ten years, 
perhaps adjusted by field. I would be reluctant to allow dismissal of tenured faculty 
for extremely poor scholarship based on negative assessments of quality because that 
would pose too much risk of deterring risky or innovative scholarship that could 
unfairly be called poor by the conventional wisdom of professional peers. For 
scholarship, therefore, I would restrict the definition of incompetence to an extreme 
lack of productivity that is essentially nonperformance. Yet I think it is defensible to 
have a standard, as contemplated by the 1915 Declaration, permitting dismissal for 
scholarship that a respected and fairly chosen body of professional peers deemed 
substantially below any reasonable standard of minimal competence. For teaching, I 
would prefer a standard that requires a lengthy period of extremely low student 
evaluations or of numerous student complaints, followed by classroom evaluations 
by professional peers independently finding extraordinarily poor teaching. 
V. CASE LAW 
Largely because administrators are so reluctant to bring dismissal charges against 
tenured faculty members, particularly in situations involving incompetence, case law 
on this subject is very limited. Yet the few decisions clearly indicate that courts are 
inclined to uphold recommendations of a peer review committee that a tenured 
professor should be dismissed for incompetence, even if university regulations do 
not specify incompetence as cause for dismissal. 
In two separate decisions, the Eighth Circuit upheld the findings of faculty hearing 
committees at the University of Minnesota that tenured professors were incompetent 
and should be dismissed.89 The tenure code specified incompetence as cause.90 The 
first decision cited long-standing complaints by students, colleagues, and department 
chairs about poor teaching, unexcused absences from classes, absences from faculty 
meetings, low student enrollment, and undocumented research, though it did not 
report the actual findings of the faculty hearing committee.91 The second decision 
relied on findings by the faculty hearing committee that the professor was 
incompetent and had committed plagiarism, though it did not provide further details 
about the basis for these findings.92 The dismissed professor in the first case was 
black and claimed that the University had unconstitutionally terminated his 
appointment based on his race.93 To support this claim, he pointed out that he was 
the only black full professor ever terminated by the University and that a former 
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chairman of his department, Afro-American and African Studies, had speculated that 
some white members of the faculty might not have been terminated had they 
performed as poorly as he.94 He also cited statistics indicating the low percentage of 
black faculty members and students at the University and statements by a member of 
the faculty hearing committee, the dean of his college, and a regent that, in his 
opinion, revealed racial prejudice.95 The dismissed professor in the second case was 
an East Indian Caucasian and a Hindu who claimed that the termination of his 
appointment constituted disparate and discriminatory treatment under Title VII 
because he was treated more harshly than similarly situated non-minority 
professors.96 
In both cases, the court concluded that the record did not support these claims of 
discrimination. In describing the claims of the black faculty member, the court 
observed that, in the opinion of the former chair, he had “repeatedly failed to 
maintain a minimum level of performance” and that the percentage of blacks in the 
Minnesota population was roughly the same as the percentage of black faculty and 
students at the University of Minnesota.97 Rejecting the claims of discrimination by 
the East Indian professor, the court acknowledged that some other professors “may 
have scored lower . . . on isolated items” in the student evaluations, but also pointed 
out that his scores “viewed as a whole placed him at or very near the bottom when 
compared with his peers.”98 Nor did the court find any evidence to support his claim 
that the administration ignored allegations of plagiarism against other professors.99  
To my knowledge, the most thorough judicial discussion of the recommendation 
of a faculty hearing committee to dismiss a tenured professor for incompetence 
occurred in a decision by an Indiana appellate court in a case that arose at Ball State 
University, an institution whose regulations did not specifically refer to 
incompetence. The committee found incompetence in both teaching and scholarship. 
As evidence of incompetence in teaching, the committee cited excessive time spent 
on irrelevant subjects, the failure to cover basic course material, and lack of adequate 
preparation and organization.100 As evidence of incompetence in scholarship, the 
committee reported that the professor had not engaged in any research activities or 
published any scholarship during the prior ten years.101 The committee also observed 
that the professor had rarely attended faculty meetings, had not participated in those 
he did attend, and had not served on a doctoral committee or any other university 
committee in over a decade.102 
In rejecting the dismissed professor’s claim that the University had not relied on 
sufficiently ascertainable standards, the court concluded that it was “not feasible” to 
define incompetence.103 It held that Ball State legitimately relied on the provision of 
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the Indiana code allowing dismissal of faculty for violations of a university’s “‘rules 
or standards of conduct’”104 and on references to proper standards of conduct in the 
faculty handbook.105 To support its conclusion, the court referred to an earlier decision 
by the Seventh Circuit denying a professor’s challenge to the lack of specificity in 
Ball State’s regulations.106 In the earlier case, the University based its charges on 
asserted violations of the AAUP’s Statement on Professional Ethics, which it had 
adopted and published in its faculty handbook.107 The faculty hearing committee 
found that the professor’s sexual misconduct violated the language of the Statement 
prohibiting “‘exploitation of students’” for a professor’s “‘private advantage.’”108 The 
professor claimed that the University denied him the “‘adequate notice’” of prohibited 
activity required by the Fourteenth Amendment because the Statement did not 
explicitly refer to sexual misconduct.109 The Seventh Circuit disagreed. “As is the case 
with other laws, codes and regulations governing conduct,” the court asserted, “it is 
unreasonable to assume that the drafters of the Statement on Professional Ethics could 
and must specifically delineate each and every type of conduct (including deviant 
conduct) constituting a violation.”110 The court added that the professor’s “academic 
peers” on the faculty hearing committee “were well-qualified to interpret” the 
Statement and, more generally, “to determine what is and is not acceptable faculty 
conduct within an academic setting.”111 
Reinforcing this reluctance to impose requirements of specificity on universities, 
the Third Circuit subsequently reasoned that a regulation at Rutgers University 
defining adequate cause as “‘failure to maintain standards of sound scholarship and 
competent teaching’” encompassed findings of a faculty hearing panel that a 
professor had engaged in unethical conduct regarding visiting Chinese scholars.112 
The committee’s findings included that the professor’s “verbal abuse and 
intimidation of the scholars created a climate in which they felt compelled to perform 
domestic services” for him;113 that he had “interrupted without sufficient cause” the 
laboratory class taught by a Chinese teaching assistant and had “treat[ed] her in an 
unprofessional, threatening and abusive manner within the hearing of . . . her 
students” and others;114 that he hired postdoctoral Chinese scholars who did not have 
proper credentials;115 and that he submitted a candidate’s application for admission 
to the graduate program even though he knew it “contained a recommendation letter 
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of questionable integrity.”116 The court concluded that the language of the university 
regulation, while “broad and general,” was not unconstitutionally vague.117 The 
regulation did not “fail to specify any standard for dismissal but rather provide[d] a 
standard which encompasses a wide range of conduct.”118 A reasonable professor, 
the court reasoned, would know that the regulation went beyond “actual teaching or 
research skills.”119 The court also observed that the professor’s actions “sprang from 
his role as a faculty member” and undermined the conditions for maintaining “sound 
scholarship and competent teaching.”120 In reaching this conclusion, the Third 
Circuit panel reversed the district court judge, who found that “sound scholarship 
and competent teaching” could not reasonably be construed to include the professor’s 
unethical conduct.121 Distinguishing the dismissal for unethical conduct at Ball State, 
the district judge emphasized that the Ball State regulation specifically provided that 
a violation of the Statement of Professional Ethics could constitute cause for 
dismissal.122 The Rutgers regulation on cause for dismissal, by contrast, did not 
incorporate or refer to its own Statement on Professional Ethics, which did not itself 
indicate that violations could lead to dismissal.123 The judge regretted this omission 
but concluded that it prevented her from upholding the dismissal.124 
More generally, courts have viewed the 1940 Statement and other “widely 
circulated and widely accepted”125 statements by the AAUP as reflecting the norms 
and expectations of the academic profession that should inform the interpretation of 
contracts between professors and universities.126 In a particularly striking example, 
the Fourth Circuit held that a college in a condition of financial exigency could 
terminate the appointment of a tenured professor even though the college’s 
regulations defined tenure as “‘the right to continued service unless good cause be 
shown for termination’” and did not refer to financial exigency.127 Emphasizing that 
the 1940 Statement contains the most widely accepted definition of tenure, the court 
pointed out that it included financial exigency as a basis for terminating a tenured 
appointment in the absence of adequate cause.128 Because the 1940 Statement 
specifically refers to incompetence as an adequate cause for dismissal, it is likely that 
courts would similarly allow termination for this reason even if a university’s own 
policies did not. Yet detailed definitions of incompetence, even if not required by 
law, would provide helpful guidance to both faculty members and administrators 
about expectations after tenure. In addition to giving fair notice to professors who 
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might be charged with incompetence, specificity would describe objective standards 
of evaluation that might make it easier for faculty hearing committees to exercise the 
“impersonal judgment” and “judicial severity”129 demanded by the 1915 Declaration.  
VI. RESPONDING TO POTENTIAL CONCERNS ABOUT INCREASED ENFORCEMENT 
I want to close by responding to potential objections to my view that more 
dismissal proceedings should be brought against incompetent tenured professors. I 
believe that the standards I propose dramatically reduce concerns that charges of 
incompetence could be used as a pretext for illegal or improper actions, such as 
violations of academic freedom and employment discrimination. If incompetence is 
specifically limited to gross deficiencies in quality or productivity, if remediation 
must precede disciplinary proceedings, if lesser sanctions should be considered 
before dismissal, and if dismissal is described as a rare and extraordinary remedy, 
there would be few opportunities for pretextual abuse. These strict and specific 
standards should also avoid erroneous findings of incompetence. And if the danger 
of actual abuse and mistakes is substantially minimized, so is the danger that people 
will misconstrue legitimate proceedings as improper.  
Dismissal proceedings are costly in money and time. Universities have substantial 
legal expenses, especially if a professor subsequently litigates a finding of cause for 
dismissal. For professors, service on a faculty hearing committee can be extremely 
time consuming.130 Procedural errors can require reversals of findings made after 
lengthy hearings. But I feel that these costs are justified to insure the proper 
functioning of the tenure system and to improve public support of it. I also suspect 
that the financial cost of a dismissal proceeding is not great compared to the buyouts 
that many universities give as inducements for professors to retire. And though the 
cost in time for a faculty member to serve on a hearing committee is substantial, it is 
unlikely to happen more than once in a career. Service on a hearing committee can 
also bring the satisfaction of performing one’s professional responsibilities, just as 
service on a jury can bring the satisfaction of performing one’s civic responsibilities. 
Under the standards I propose, I doubt there would be a huge number of dismissal 
proceedings. After a university has prevailed in one, I suspect that the mere threat of 
filing charges will induce other incompetent professors to resign. I also observe that 
the current institutional reluctance to take action against incompetent tenured 
professors extends even to urging them to resign. In my experience, such 
encouragement can be surprisingly effective in the rare instances when it occurs. 
Through personal observation, I am aware of an academic administrator who 
initiated discussions that led two extremely unproductive senior professors to resign 
without any negative institutional ramifications. No one had ever previously 
approached these professors even though they had been unproductive for decades. I 
have also realized that post-tenure review has produced some resignations of 
incompetent professors. Post-tenure review is appropriately designed to maintain 
competence and to offer remediation when recommended by faculty peers rather than 
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as a first step in dismissal proceedings. But some professors, after receiving 
extremely negative reviews, decide to resign or retire rather than to begin a program 
of remediation. I have been told by a former administrator that in the years 
immediately following implementation of post-tenure review there was a doubling 
of annual resignations by tenured professors.131 A special report of the Virginia 
General Assembly in 2004 provides more comprehensive data. After examining all 
400 post-tenure reviews in the 16 Virginia public colleges and universities from 
1998–99 through 2002–03, the report determined that 286 found no problems.132 Of 
the remainder, 52 led to decisions by the professor under review to terminate 
employment, mostly by retirement.133 Among faculty found deficient, 26 
subsequently met all expectations for improvement and 35 did not.134 The majority 
of these 35 agreed to phased retirement.135 Others accepted mandatory teacher 
training, changes in workload assignments, and freezes or reductions in salary.136 
Only 2 were dismissed.137 These voluntary departures indicate that a university that 
is serious about addressing incompetence can often use effective measures short of 
costly dismissal proceedings. 
Some administrators worry that peer review committees will not uphold charges 
of incompetence. I disagree. Although Kingman Brewster was correct in identifying 
“human” reasons for not invoking dismissal for cause, I think peer review 
committees, confronted with convincing evidence of incompetence, would vote for 
dismissal as a matter of professional responsibility, especially if institutional 
regulations defined incompetence in the specific and extreme terms I suggest. The 
very few litigated cases involving incompetence as cause for dismissal support my 
view.138 It is also worth reiterating that under the AAUP’s widely adopted 
Recommended Institutional Regulations, even if the faculty hearing committee votes 
against dismissal, the administration and the governing board can reverse as long as 
they provide reasons in writing and allow the faculty committee a chance to respond 
and reconsider.139 If the dismissed faculty member appeals the administrative 
reversal of a faculty committee to a court, I think the court, consistent with the 
justification for expert peer review in the 1915 Declaration, properly would be more 
likely to find for the faculty member than if the faculty committee had itself 
recommended dismissal. But if the evidence of incompetence is sufficiently strong, 
as in the case at Ball State, I think a court, consistent with the warning in the 1915 
Declaration about the consequences of the failure of faculty to “purge” incompetent 
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colleagues, properly would be likely to uphold the dismissal even if the 
administration and the board reversed the faculty committee. I am not aware of a 
judicial decision reviewing an administrative reversal of a faculty hearing 
committee’s finding that adequate cause for dismissal had not been established. But 
in the case at Ball State the faculty committee, which initially recommended 
probation for three years for unethical conduct, subsequently recommended 
dismissal when the board of trustees rejected probation and remanded the case for 
reconsideration.140 
In my opinion, broader concerns about human costs provide by far the most 
significant explanation for the reluctance to bring dismissal proceedings against 
clearly incompetent professors. Even if members of a faculty hearing committee 
would fulfill their professional “obligation” to exercise “impersonal judgment” and, 
when necessary, “judicial severity,” as the 1915 Declaration urges,141 there is a 
widespread aversion within universities to imposing this task. It is difficult to tell a 
colleague, and particularly a friend, that his performance does not meet minimal 
standards of competence. It is much more difficult to end that person’s career through 
dismissal. In addition to the disastrous impact on the dismissed professor, the 
proceeding can generate lingering conflict within the university community among 
those who have different views on whether charges should have been brought. 
Universities require collegiality to perform their educational missions. For many 
administrators as well as faculty, the potential cost to collegiality produced by 
dismissal proceedings far outweighs the cost of tolerating the small number of 
professors who are clearly incompetent. 
The 1915 Declaration recognized that many professors might find the obligation 
of peer review “unwelcome and burdensome.”142 Yet it warned that if faculty do not 
accept this obligation, the task of purging the incompetent would be performed by 
others, who would lack the expertise to make informed judgments and who would 
be more likely to take inappropriate factors into account, including, most 
importantly, considerations that violate academic freedom.143 This warning has not 
materialized. In fact, university administrators, rather than asserting more authority 
for themselves over faculty dismissals, are primarily responsible for the extreme 
underutilization of peer review. Administrators must take the initiative in bringing 
charges of incompetence before a peer review committee, and they rarely do so. 
Overwhelmingly, trustees, alumni, and government officials have not tried to 
intervene in the assessment of faculty competence, perhaps in large part because they 
are convinced by the argument of the 1915 Declaration that only faculty have the 
required expertise. 
Although the underutilization of peer review has not produced the dangers 
foreseen by the 1915 Declaration, there are good reasons, stressed by the 1915 
Declaration itself, for universities to bring dismissal proceedings against the clearly 
incompetent. Academic freedom and tenure provide professors at American 
universities much more autonomy and security than most employees. The 1915 
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Declaration convincingly reasons that autonomy and security enable professors to 
perform their vital social function of producing and disseminating knowledge.144 The 
1915 Declaration is equally convincing in reasoning that this social function imposes 
“correlative obligations”145 on professors to monitor departures from professional 
standards. The protection of academic freedom does not extend to unprofessional 
speech. The protection of tenure does not extend to professional misconduct, failure 
to meet minimal standards of quality, or extreme lack of productivity. These 
departures from professional standards impede the production and dissemination of 
knowledge. The convincing arguments for academic freedom and tenure cannot be 
sustained unless professional standards are maintained by the faculty peers who are 
able to assess them. 
The underenforcement of incompetence as cause to dismiss tenured faculty 
undermines the integrity of the protection of academic freedom through tenure. It 
weakens public support for tenure in general, thereby jeopardizing academic 
freedom. I think that these costs are greater than the human costs that dismissal for 
cause imposes on the dismissed professor and on collegiality generally. And though 
dismissal has an enormous personal cost, organizations, including universities, have 
legitimate interests in firing clearly incompetent employees. While the job functions 
of a professor justify the special protection of academic freedom, they do not justify 
special protection for incompetence. I also think that there would not be substantial 
conflict disrupting collegiality if dismissal proceedings are brought under the strict 
standards I propose and are justified as a means to uphold the legitimate function of 
tenure in protecting academic freedom. It is worth observing as well that the 
toleration of incompetence causes some conflict and loss of collegiality among 
professors, which would be alleviated through the proper use of dismissal 
proceedings. Indeed, I predict that faculty morale would improve if charges were 
brought against the few people who are widely recognized as clearly incompetent. It 
is often bad for faculty morale to have such colleagues. I know it is for mine. It makes 
me feel complicit in an institutional failure to maintain professional standards and 
the proper operation of the tenure system, in which I deeply believe. 
Proceedings to dismiss tenured faculty members for incompetence should be rare, 
but not as rare as they currently are. Administrators should bring charges before 
faculty hearing committees in appropriately extreme circumstances and should give 
substantial deference to their decisions. Doing so would uphold the principle of 
academic freedom, based on professional competence as determined by peer review, 
that is at the heart of the 1915 Declaration and that is still convincing today. 
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